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1.  Introduction 
The influence of politics in supra-national financial integration has been long-recognised as a 
determining factor in the outcome of such arrangements (Mundell, 1961; Haas, 1968).
 Methods 
developed to address this topic have approached the central hypothesis from subject-specific 
points of view and generated a sizeable amount of applied research predominantly based on the 
European Union (EU) case. However, the multi-dimensional nature of supra-national integration 
has prevented most subject-specific studies from adequately addressing the topic. Neo-
functionalist work on the topic tended to be complex and expository, and approach the 
assessment of the influence of politics on economic variables through analysis of the frequency 
and nature of decision-making arising through supra-national institutions. Many studies suffered 
from several shortcomings that prevented the development of formal, universal models capable 
of analysing less institutionalised integration initiatives like those found outside of Western 
Europe. 
 
Similarly, Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theorists developed several sophisticated models, 
measures and tools to assess supra-national integration. These included, among others, 
assessments of the long-term government bond yields, cross-sectional dispersion in bond yields, 
beta coefficients in equity markets and the convergence of underwriting fees and margins on 
lending in financial services (Berg et al, 2005). However, these models, measures and tools 
largely assumed a pre-existence of political willingness and an institutional means with which to 
engage in further financial integration. When applied outside of the confines of the structured 
and highly-institutionalised setting provided by its case study (traditionally the EU) their 
exploratory ability was limited when it came to addressing the influence of politics in other 
supra-national financial integrative initiatives. The Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is one such case in which its largely unstructured and non-institutionalised setting 
negates the use of traditional approaches to assess the influence of politics on supra-national 
financial integration.   
 3 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the politics of ASEAN is influencing the 
development of supra-national financial integration within South-East Asia’s financial markets. 
To undertake such an analysis, a recent time series model developed by Bai and Perron (1998a) 
will be employed together with a methodology developed, on the same basis, by Caporale and 
Grier (2005a). 
 
Bai and Perron (1998a) developed a highly powerful time-series model capable of estimating and 
testing for multiple structural breaks within a time-series. When utilised in conjunction with a 
political model comprising of several dummy variables, the Bai and Perron (1998a) model 
provides a robust means with which to analyse the influence of politics on an economic time-
series. 
 
There has been a limited use of time-series analysis on the political-economic aspects of 
integration. A notable study was undertaken by Caporaso and Pelowski (1971), who utilised a 
time-series based quasi-experimental analysis
2, within the context of European integration.   In 
particular, Caporaso and Pelowski’s (1971) analysis relied upon the use of an interrupted time-
series design as part of a quasi-experimental analysis which, in econometric terms, identifies a 
structural break in a time series upon the introduction of an exogenous variable. Although 
Caporaso and Pelowski’s (1971) concept was correct, their methodology possessed several major 
pitfalls, the two most significant being: the breaks in the time series were not determined 
endogenously
3 and, it was quasi-experimental. Chistiano (1992) demonstrates that a fundamental 
criteria for using standard sampling theory in testing time series for structural breaks is that the 
date of the structural break, if any, should be chosen independently of prior information about 
the data or some related series (i.e. endogenously). Chistiano (1992) argues that such a criterion 
is implausible, especially when it comes to applied research which largely depends on exogenous 
determination of a structural break. However, this fundamental criterion was met with the 
subsequent development of endogenously determined tests for structural breaks – such as that 
applied in this paper. Similarly, the fundamental weakness of quasi-experimental research is that 
                                                            
2 Explained by Caporaso and Pelowski (1971) to be when the random assignment to treatment groups is not possible, and/or if the 
independent variable (or “event”) is “socially given” i.e. not under experimental control. 
3 Endogenous determination of breaks is general methodological consensus of more recent time-series analysis. 4 
 
the resultant analysis leaves much room for interpretation and debate. Both of these pitfalls are 
addressed through the use of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model and application of the Caporale 
and Grier (2005a) methodology
4. 
 
Joint application of Bai and Perron (1998a) and Caporale and Grier (2005a) have been 
undertaken successfully in other fields of study in order to gauge the influence of 
politics/leadership on the variable under investigation. These joint applications are, however, few 
in number. In the case of Smyth and Narayan (2004)
5, the joint application was able to identify 
structural breaks in, and the effect of leadership on, the opinions of the High Court of Australia 
between 1904 and 2001. In Smyth and Narayan (2006), a similar joint application was capable of 
estimating the number and location of structural breaks in, and the effect of leadership on, the 
opinions of the US Supreme Court between 1800 and 1991. Caporale and Grier (2005a) used the 
joint application to test for the effect of political changes on monetary policy, based on shifts in 
the US and UK real interests rates between 1961-1994 and 1961-1999 respectively. In Caporale 
and Grier (2005b), the joint application was utilised to assess the effect of changes in political 
groupings on an interrelated “inflation regime” based on shifts in the US real interest rate 
between 1961 and 2000. Similarly, Rapach and Wohar (2005) utilised the joint application with 
nominal interest and inflation rate data, between 1960 and 1998, to analyse the effect of regime 
changes on the international real interest rates of 13 industrialised countries. 
 
In all cases, the effect of politics (referred to as a regime) is assessed at a point in time at which a 
change occurs in the entity (referred to as regime change or leadership switch) that controls, in 
part or full, the decision-making process that underpins the variable utilised to estimate and 
locate the structural breaks. In the case of Smyth and Narayan (2004, 2006), regime changes 
were considered to be the change in the leadership of the court i.e. the Chief Justice. Caporale 
and Grier (2005a) considered regime changes to the leadership of either the executive branch of 
government or change in the directorship/chairmanship of the central monetary authority. 
Caporale and Grier (2005b) broadened their concept of regime change to include changes to a 
                                                            
4 The Bai and Perron (1998a) model and Caporale and Grier (2005a) methodology are explained more formally later in the paper. 
5 Smyth and Narayan (2004) in their paper utilised the earlier, unpublished version of Caporale and Grier (2005a). 5 
 
political party’s control of the executive branch of government and changes in chairmanship of 
the central monetary authority. While Rapach and Wohar (2005), considered regime change to 
be the changes in the process governing the inflation rate and included changes in party control 
of the executive and legislative branches of government. 
 
For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, the use of the term “regime” refers to the entity 
that controls, in part or full, the collective decision-making surrounding the process of financial 
integration within ASEAN; namely, the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meetings. A change in 
regime is considered to be the changes in leadership/chairmanship of the ASEAN Financial 
Ministers’ Meetings and related entities
6. The effect of the change in regime is gauged through 
the analysis of two equity market-based indicators between 1994 and 2007. 
 
Consistent with the studies mentioned above, this paper approaches the topic in three stages. In 
the first stage, the stationarity of the data is investigated through the application of several unit 
root tests. In the second, provided the data is stationary, the Bai and Perron (1998a) model is 
applied to estimate and locate multiple structural breaks. In stage three, the Caporale and Grier 
(2005a) methodology is applied in order to analyse whether politics (as indicated through a 
change in regime) is influencing financial integration
7. 
 
On this basis, the findings indicate that the majority of regimes under consideration do 
correspond with the break dates identified by Bai and Perron (1998a) and that their influence 
over financial integration has increased over time. However, the effect of the regime 
changes/switches of leadership has had negligible implications for the integration of South-East 
Asia’s financial markets. 
 
                                                            
6 The basis for this conceptualisation of regime and what constitutes a change in regime is discussed under a later section of this 
paper. 
7 The details of these test and the applications in this study are discussed later in the paper. 6 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 the ASEAN regime and its 
decision-making processes are investigated. In Sections 3 and 4, an overview of the data (used in 
this paper) is presented and their stationarity properties determined. In Section 5, an estimation 
of the number and location of structural break are undertaken, before, in Section 6, an analysis is 




2.  Institutional Features of ASEAN 
ASEAN was established through the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 and during the course of its 
existence expanded its membership to include 10 South-East Asian States. ASEAN as a regional 
institution has lacked many of the formal structures traditionally associated with regional 
integration initiatives
8 and has developed in accordance with its central ethos: consensus based 
decision-making. This has, under ASEAN’s informal institutional framework, prevented the 
domination of any single member in the decision-making process and has, concomitantly, made 
any key ASEAN institutional features inextricably linked to the decision-making processes 
among its member States (Tan, 2003; Thambaipillai et al, 1985). 
 
ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making is conducted via the members’ Heads of 
State/Leaders or their Ministers. There are currently no Ambassadorial or equivalent 
representation at a regional/ASEAN level, meaning that ASEAN decisions and policies are 
negotiated between the members’ governments prior to their proclamation through the ASEAN 
framework.  
 
The official organisational structure of ASEAN is outlined in Figure 1. Initiated in 1992, the 
Heads of State/Leaders Summits (ASEAN SUMMIT) forms the highest decision making organ 
in ASEAN to which all other organs are subordinated. The frequency of Heads of State/Leaders 
                                                            
8 Despite the introduction of the ASEAN Charter in 2007.  7 
 
Summits was initially intended to be 3 years but has, since 1996, been held on an annual basis. 
Although regarded as the highest decision making organ, the Heads of State/Leaders Summits 
main function is to agree on, and proclaim, decisions and changes in policies. The actual policy 
and decision making executed through the ASEAN framework is made at the ministerial level 
and currently consists of 3 permanent annual ministerial meetings/groupings: the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meetings (AMM); the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) and; the 
ASEAN Finance Ministers Meetings (AFMM) (Tan, 2003; ASEAN, 2004b). 
 
Prior to 1992, the highest decision making organ in ASEAN was the AMM. The AMM 
comprised of the members’ Foreign Ministers and was responsible for all aspects of policy 
formation and decision making for ASEAN. This role was shared in 1975 with the introduction 
of the AEM: the organ mandated with decision-making on all economic matters. In 1997, this 
role was shared further with the introduction of the AFMM which was established with the 
express purpose of:  
“…concrete and pragmatic cooperation in the area of finance as a part of the building block to 
realise ASEAN's goal of greater economic integration.” (ASEAN, 1997a) 
  
The chairmanship/leadership of ASEAN’s ministerial level meetings (AMM, AEM, and AFMM) 
rotates alphabetically by member on an annual basis. Each ministerial level meeting has attached 
a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) - usually comprising of senior public servants in relevant 
fields - and various working groups that provide the mechanism for policy negotiations and 
decision-making when the ministerial meetings are not in session. The country holding the 
chair/leadership at the ministerial level meetings extends its leadership position for the period to 
its subordinated SOM. The only exception to the organisational structure is the Office of the 
Secretary General which is subordinated to the AMM and is mandated to assist in ASEAN’s 
general administration and with the coordination of its activities. (Tan, 2003; ASEAN, 2004b). 
 
Thus, for the purposes of the analysis in this paper, the “regime” under consideration refers to the 
entity that controls, in part or full, the collective decision-making surrounding the process of 8 
 
financial integration within ASEAN, namely the AFMM (inclusive of its subordinated entities). 
Similarly, the change in leadership is considered to be the switch in chairmanship of the AFMM. 
Details of the chairmanship of the AFMM can be found in Table 1. 
 
3.  Overview of Data 
The paper utilises two sets of time series data for its analysis, viz.:  
1.  The FTSE/ASEAN benchmark index (“benchmark index” or “FTSE/ASEAN series”) – 
Figure 2; 
2.  The Invesco ASEAN Equity Fund (“equity fund” or “Invesco Series”) – Figure 3. 
Both sets of data, reported in US dollars, are available through the Datastream database and 
comprise of 5225 daily observations for the period of 1 January 1994 to 31 December 2007. In 
order not to exceed the limitations of current levels of computing power , the frequency of 
observations in both data sets were converted from a daily to weekly basis through the recordal 
of the observations on the Wednesday of each week. This produced two (independent) datasets 
of 730 weekly observations. The natural logarithms of the weekly observations were employed 
in all computations utilised in this paper. 
 
The period between 1994 and 2007 is significant in the life of ASEAN as a regional integrative 
initiative. The period is inclusive of most of the time in which ASEAN has prioritised economic 
and financial integration on its political agenda and concomitantly concluded several enabling 
agreements that were intended to shape the Association in this regard.  
 
The FTSE/ASEAN benchmark index is produced by the FTSE Company in association with five 
of ASEAN’s members’ stock exchanges
9.  The benchmark index covers 90 to 95 percent of the 
investable market capitalisation of ASEAN's 5 major economic markets which together account 
                                                            
9 The five exchanges are: PT Bursa Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock Exchange) - Indonesia, Bursa Malaysia Berhad -Malaysia, The 
Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. - Philippines, Singapore Exchange - Singapore and The Stock Exchange of Thailand - Thailand. 9 
 
for the majority of ASEAN’s productive capacity - approximately 91 percent of ASEAN’s Gross 
Domestic Product (FTSE, 2006:6).  
 
The Invesco ASEAN Equity Fund is a sub-fund of the unit trust known as the Invesco Funds 
Series 1. The objective of the equity fund is to achieve long-term capital growth through 
geographical asset allocation/investment in some or all of the ASEAN member countries. Asset 
allocation by country varies from time to time but the class of investable assets remain as listed 
equity or equity-related securities (including warrants and convertible securities) of companies 
which operate in or stand to benefit from their operations in and business links with ASEAN 
countries
10 (Invesco, 2008). 
 
The use of the benchmark index and/or equity fund as the economic variable in the analysis has 
several advantages and constraints. The primary advantage of these economic variables is their 
composition as ASEAN focussed equity-based measures. This allows for the intended analysis of 
financial integration in ASEAN while still relying on a generally held assumption and a well 
specified theory
11: politics matters when assessing financial integration and the Law-of-One-
Price.  
 
The Law-of-One-Price dictates that the prices of fully homogenous products across a single 
market are the same irrespective of the geographic domicile of the buyers and sellers
12. This, in 
turn, implies minimised transportation or transaction costs. During the process of integration, 
prices of fully homogenous goods are expected to converge across traditionally segmented 
markets. Concomitantly, the associated transportation/transaction costs are expected to decline 
and converge (Ferrando & Vesala, 2005). It is on this basis that the Law-of-One-Price and its 
associated models are heavily relied upon for the assessment of integration (Mongelli, 2005). By 
convention and in terms of financial integration, the Law-of-One-Price prescribes a convergence 
                                                            
10 Performance of the Invesco ASEAN equity fund is gauged relative to the Morningstar IM EQ ASEAN Index and not that of 
the FTSE/ASEAN benchmark index. 
11 As called for by Caporale and Grier (2005a) when applying their methodology. 
12 Traditionally regarded to be the outcome/end point of an integration arrangement.  10 
 
of returns on similarly risky assets and a reduction and convergence of associated transaction 
costs
13 across traditionally segmented markets i.e. nil arbitrage. Reciprocally, the prices of 
similarly risky assets are expected to react to factors that are shared across the integrated 
financial market. In this regard, a fundamental shared factor is that of common information and 
has led to the development of indirect news-based measures of financial integration (Ferrando & 
Vesala, 2005). Bekaert and Harvey’s (1997) study of emerging equity market volatility provides 
evidence of the link between the Law-of-One-Price and shared factors by demonstrating that the 
greater the degree of financial integration, the stronger the positive correlation between volatility 
of equity market returns and common information. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the 
relationship between the Law-of-One-Price and common informational factors inherent to the 
politics of ASEAN will impact on volatility of equity returns in ASEAN’s financial market. An 
analysis of which, over time, is expected to reveal how ASEAN politics is influencing supra-
national financial integration within South-East Asia. 
 
However, a central constraint remains in that suitable financial market-based integration 
indicators need to be identified for an ASEAN financial market that, in an institutional sense, 
does not yet exist. Generally, the availability of data covering indicators of financial integration 
in ASEAN are severely limited as many of the member States do not produce or release the 
relevant information and are not obliged to publicly report such data through the ASEAN 
initiative (even in light of the recent introduction of the ASEAN Charter). 
 
To capture financial market integration in ASEAN, suitable indicators should be financial market 
based, limited in geographic scope and provide sufficient (preferably full) coverage of the market 
under investigation. The benchmark index and the equity fund meet these requirements and are 
the means with which to overcome the central constraint. As equity-based indicators, their 
structure covers a significant portion of the investable market (especially in the case of the 
benchmark index) and; can vary in investment composition and location  (as in the case of the 
equity fund) but remain restricted to the ASEAN region. Despite their limitations, the benchmark 
index and the equity fund are suitable indicators of ASEAN equity market activity and provide 
                                                            
13 Transportation costs of financial instruments if any are expected to have a nil effect. 11 
 
data on a financial market that otherwise lacks a traditional institutional framework and reliable 
data reporting/communication mechanism.   
 
Thus, albeit that the datasets do not provide full coverage of the investment environment of 
ASEAN, their similarities as ASEAN focussed equity measures and distinctions (a benchmark 
index and an unrelated equity fund) enables them to serve as good proxies for the purposes of 
this paper’s analysis: to analyse whether the politics of ASEAN is influencing the development 
of supra-national financial integration within South-East Asia’s financial markets.  
 
 
4.  Stationarity Properties of the  Data 
A pre-requisite of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model is to establish that the time-series under 
consideration is integrated of order zero or I(0) stationary. In order to determine stationarity of 
the data utilised in the analysis, a battery of standard unit-root tests were undertaken which 
included the standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-
Philips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests
14. The results of these standard unit root tests are presented in 
Table 2. As Table 2 indicates, in each case, the series appear to be integrated of order one or I(1) 
i.e. non-stationary processes. 
 
However, time series that appear to be non-stationary under standard unit-root tests may be break 
or trend break stationary once taking account of potential shifts (structural breaks) in the level 
and/or trend (Caporale and Grier, 2005a). This phenomenon was first explored by Perron (1989) 
who concluded that the inclusion of a structural break makes many macroeconomic variables 
trend stationary. However, Perron’s (1989) approach included a break date exogenously – this 
went against the grain of subsequent research which, in turn, developed unit root tests that 
account for potential shifts in level and/or trend while determining multiple break dates 
                                                            
14 Although all three tests are unit root tests and thus address stationarity properties of the data, more than one is traditionally 
reported as a means of comparison and confirmation of test results. 12 
 
endogenously
15.  Caporale and Grier (2005a) argue that this phenomenon is particularly relevant 
when applying the Bai and Perron (1998a) model which itself identifies multiple structural 
breaks and thus automatically assumes that there is likely to be a shift in the level and/or trend of 
the series under investigation. Thus, although the standard unit root tests are informative, an 
augmented unit root test that accounts for potential shifts in the level and/or trend and determines 
break dates endogenously is required. 
 
In this vein, an augmented KPSS test developed by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) was applied 
to the time-series under consideration. The Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS test provides 
two advantages over the tests mentioned above viz.:  
1.  It is a KPSS test and thus considers a null hypothesis of stationarity,  which is argued to 
be a more natural hypothesis for many economic problems, and; 
2.  It can accommodate more than two breaks when assessing the stationarity qualities of a 
series - a likely phenomenon when testing long-term time-series
16. 
 
The Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS test is designed to test for stationarity of a panel while 
taking account of potential multiple structural breaks. Carrion-i-Silvestre et al’s (2005) KPSS 
test is thus intended for direct application with a panel, which is not the case in this paper’s 
analysis of two univariate time series. However, the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS test is 
an extension of Hadri (2000) stationary panel test that produces a test statistic that utilises the 
average of the univariate KPSS stationarity tests proposed by Kwiatowski et al (1992)
17 . This 
means that for the purposes of this paper’s analysis, one-half of the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al 
(2005) KPSS test can be utilised to assess stationarity properties of the univariate time-series 
under consideration, while still taking into account the possibilities of multiple structural breaks. 
The Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS test allows for two forms referred to as Model 1 and 
                                                            
15 Notable studies in this regard include, among others:  Zivot and Andews (1992) single-break unit root test, Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997) two break unit root test and Lee and Strazicich (2004) minimum Lagrange-Multiplier one and two break unit root 
tests.  
16 See Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) critique of endogenous break literature and Libanio (2005) for an overview of unit root 
testing for macroeconomic time series.  
17 Refer to Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005) for further details as to the linkage between these papers. 13 
 
Model 2. For the purposes of this paper’s analysis Model 2 is applied due to our use of trending 




The Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS test defines the model to test the null hypothesis of 




 where DU is the indicator dummy variable for a mean shift k at time t and DT is the indicator 





Based on Hadri (2000), Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) express the Lagrange multiplier (LM) 















where S denotes the partial sum process obtained using the estimated ordinary least squares 
residuals of (1), ω is a consistent estimate of long-run variance and λ denotes the dependence of 
the test on dates of the break.  
 
In order to estimate the break dates required by the test, Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) suggest 
the Bai and Perron (1998a) method to select the estimate of the dates of the breaks that minimise 
the individual series sum of squared residuals (SSR). To under take this estimation, a trimming 
region and a maximum number of breaks (Mmax) need to be specified. The choice of trimming, 
as noted by Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005), is considered to be arbitrary. For the purposes of this 
paper’s analysis a trimming of [0.10T, 0.90T] and Mmax=8 were specified. The results of the 
application of the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) test to the univariate time series are presented 
in Table 3. 
 
As Table 3 indicates, both series utilising Carrion-i-Silvestre et al’s (2005) Model 2  (i.e. 
allowing for breaks in the intercept and trend) prove to be break-point stationary. Carrion-i-
Silvestre et al (2005) recommend that when including trending regressors, as in Model 2, the 
number of structural breaks should be estimated utilising the modified Schwartz information 
criteria (LWZ). This recommendation is adopted in the application of the Bai and Perron (1998a) 
model below. 
 
5.  Number and Location of Break Dates 
As the stationarity properties of the two univariate sets of data have been established to be break-
point stationary an application of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model was undertaken. The Bai and 
Perron (1998a) model provides a means with which to test for, and estimate, multiple structural 
changes in a stationary time series. The Bai and Perron (1998a) model is a highly versatile and 
powerful test, which produces a set of confidence intervals for the estimated multiple structural 15 
 
changes of a time series – the utility of this aspect of the model is discussed in the next section of 
the paper.  
 
The Bai and Perron (1998a) model considers a multiple linear regression model with m breaks 
and (m+1) regimes: 
 
 
where yt is the observed dependent variable at time t; x (p x 1) and z (q x 1) are vectors of 
covariates and β and  δj (j = 1, …, m+1) are the corresponding vectors of coefficients; u is the 
disturbance at time t. The break points, indices (T1, …, Tm), are explicitly treated as unknown. 
 
The purpose of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model is to estimate the unknown regression 
coefficients along with the unknown break points. This is undertaken through least squares 
estimation of the vectors of coefficients by minimising the sum of squared residuals for each m-
partition (T1, …, Tm) and then by substituting the estimated vectors of coefficients into the 
objective function (4) which provide the estimated break points (Ť1, …, Ťm). Thus, Bai and 
Perron (1998a) conclude that the break-point estimators are the global minimisers of the 
objective function
19 i.e. the global minimisers of the sum of squared residuals. 
 
The Bai and Perron (1998a) model provides several F-test statistics in this regard that are 
intended to aid in the detection of any (multiple) breaks
20. These are the SupFt(L) test statistic 
and the Double Maximum test which include the UDmax and WDmax test statistics.  SupFt(L) 
test statistic determines the existence of m-number breaks in the series by searching for all 
possible break dates and minimising the difference between the restricted and unrestricted sum 
                                                            
19 Bai and Perron (1998a) utilise an algorithm based on the principle of dynamic programming to compute the estimates of the 
breakpoints which are the global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals – refer to Bai and Perron (1998b) for further details. 
20 See Smyth and Narayan (2004) and Caporale and Grier (2005a) for succinct explanations of the F-test statistics utilised by Bai 
and Perron (1998a). 
(4) 16 
 
of squares over all the potential breaks (Caporale and Grier, 2005a).  The SupFt(L) test consider 
the null hypothesis of no structural breaks (m = 0) against the alternate hypothesis of m = k 
breaks.   A SupFt(L) test is thus produced for k-potential breaks together with their appropriate 
critical values. 
 
The Double Maximum test considers the null of no structural break (m = 0) against the 
alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of breaks given some upper bound M (i.e. at least 
1 through M breaks). The UDmax statistic is the maximum value of the SupFt(L) test, discussed 
above, where L is the upper bound of the possible number of breaks, whereas the WDmax test 
statistic applies weights to the individual tests in order to equalise the p-values across values of 
m. 
 
The Bai and Perron model then determines the optimal number of break dates through the 
application of three modes, viz.: a sequential procedure (or SupFt(L+1|L) tests), Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC) and a modified Schwartz information criteria (LWZ).  Bai and Perron 
(1998a) suggest that, provided that the SupFt(L) and Double Maximum tests indicate a rejection 
of the null hypothesis of  no structural breaks, a determination of the optimal number of break 
dates be undertaken using a sequential procedure. Most literature employing the Bai and Perron 
(1998a) model, such as Caporale and Grier (2005a; 2005b), Rapach and Wohar (2005), Smyth 
and Narayan (2004; 2006), utilise the sequential procedure to determine the optimal number of 
breaks and cite Bai and Perron’s (1998a, 1998b, 2003) findings that the sequential procedure out 
performs the BIC or LWZ information criteria. However, Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) 
recommend that when including trending regressors, as the case in this paper, preference should 
be given to LWZ in estimating the optimal number of structural breaks. 
 
Before applying the Bai and Perron (1998a) model, and apart from establishing that the 
underlying data is stationary, it is required that an initial trimming region/percentage must be 
specified in order to ensure that an adequate number of degrees of freedom are available to 17 
 
calculate the initial error sum of squares. The trimming region/percentage also determines the 
maximum permissible number of breaks (m) and maximum number of regimes (m+1).  
 
In the case of this paper’s analysis, based on the application of the Bai and Perron model by 
others (e.g. Timmerman, 2001) to estimate and locate multiple structural breaks in an equity-
based time series, a trimming region of [0.10T, 0.90T] or 10 percent and m = 8 was specified. 
This results in a segment length (h) of 73 observations. 
 
The results of the application of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model to the benchmark index and 
equity fund are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Note that the critical values for each of the statistics 
are provided by Bai and Perron (1998a). 
 
As Table 4 indicates, for the FTSE/ASEAN (benchmark index) the SupFt(L) test is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for the values of L between 2 and 8, while for the Invesco 
(equity fund) the SupFt(L) test is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for L = 2 and at the 
1 percent level for the values of L between 3 and 8. The UDmax and WDmax statistics are 
significant at the 1 percent level for both the FTSE/ASEAN and Invesco series. These results 
imply that there are at least two structural breaks in the FTSE/ASEAN and Invesco series. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the modified Schwartz information criteria (LWZ) on the 
FTSE/ASEAN and Invesco series. As mentioned above, the LWZ information criterion has been 
applied due to the inclusion of trending regressors. The application of the LWZ method selected 
6 breaks in each series. The break points and their corresponding break dates are also presented 
in Table 5. The series have 3 corresponding break dates: 15 October 1997, 14 April 1999 and 2 
August 2006, while the remaining 3 break dates are estimated to occur within 1 to 6 weeks of 
each other. The estimated confidence intervals in both series are not tightly estimated, spanning 
between 84 and 160 weeks for the FTSE/ASEAN series and between 47 and 188 weeks for the 




6.  Influence of Politics on Break Dates 
Caporale and Grier (2005a) investigate the use of dummy variables in testing for the influence of 
politics on economic policies or outcomes. Caporale and Grier (2005a) emphasize that much of 
the literature investigating the influence of political variables on economic variables (and vice 
versa) suffer from the lack of a well-defined null hypothesis as to the pattern of political 
influence.   
 
In order to correct for this deficiency, Caporale and Grier (2005a) demonstrate a methodology 
that relies upon the confidence intervals generated from the application of the Bai and Perron 
(1998a) model. The assessment of the influence of political variables on economic variables is 
determined by how the break dates generated from the political dummy variables (referred to as 
an intercept shift model or political model) fit with the break dates determined through the 
application of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model to the economic variable (referred to as the 
intercept-shifting model or economic model). This is analogous to taking two parallel time lines 
– the political variable on one and the economic variable on the other – and comparing how well 
the dates on which their intercept shifts overlap.  
 
To this end, Caporale and Grier (2005a) provide criteria with which to determine whether the 
shifts in the political model can be considered to be statistically significant events. For a strong 
significance, Caporale and Grier (2005a) conclude the number of regimes implied by the 
political model (in this case the political dummy variables) must equal the number implied by the 
economic time series model (i.e. the application of the Bai and Perron(1998a) model); and that 
each  of the political break points (point of regime change) falls inside the confidence intervals 
produced by the Bai and Perron model. This would provide strong evidence in favour of the 
primacy of the political influence. Should there only be a partial match between the political 
breaks and the breaks in the time series model, then Caporale and Grier (2005a) purport that the 
influence of politics can still be argued but becomes a matter open to interpretation. 
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On this basis, Caporale and Grier (2005a) argue that a well-specified theory is essential to 
overcome any potential limitations posed by the use of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model. As 
mentioned above, the paper relies upon the use of the Law-of-One-Price and the generally 
accepted assumption that politics does matter when assessing financial integration.  
 
The AFMM regimes and their political break points over the period 1997-2008 are outlined in 
Table 1. The major reported events of each of these regimes are considered. Beginning with the 
1
st AFMM Chairmanship, the Lao PDR and Myanmar were admitted to the ASEAN Finance 
Ministers’ Meetings following their accession to ASEAN. ASEAN proclaimed several policy 
initiatives designed to improve economic and technical cooperation, transparency and stability of 
its members’ financial markets which included: improving prudential standards and the 
introduction of a regional/cooperative financing arrangement designed to supplement the 
resources available from the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions 
(ASEAN 1997a, 1997b). 
 
During the 2
nd AFMM Chairmanship, ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Surveillance 
Mechanism which was intended to assist policy making between the members through the 
monitoring of various macroeconomic indicators and information sharing (ASEAN, 1998; Rana, 
2002). Balance of payments arrangements were entered into between Malaysia and the 
Philippines and similar arrangements were under negotiation between Malaysia and Thailand 
and Malaysia and Indonesia (ASEAN 1998a, 1998b). The 1st round of negotiations on the 




rd AFMM Chairmanship witnessed the introduction of ASEAN’s position on reform of the 
international financial architecture and an emphasis by the members to encourage the financial 
recovery of the region following on from the then recent Asian Financial Crisis (ASEAN, 1999a) 
and the acceleration of the expected implementation of the ASEAN Investment Area- ASEAN’s 
mechanism for the establishment of a common market for investment (ASEAN 1999b; ASEAN, 20 
 
2006b). ASEAN also expanded its scope of financial cooperation with its ‘+3’ partners (China, 




th AFMM Chairmanship saw the establishment of working committees for the adoption and 
implementation of internationally accepted practices and standards and for cooperation on tax 
and public finance. During this Chairmanship, the ASEAN+3
21 finance and central bankers, as 
part of mutual financial assistance, established a research and training mechanism, a network 
through which to conduct regional financial surveillance and agreed to undertake a study into the 
modalities and mechanisms for a regional financing arrangement (ASEAN, 2000a). ASEAN also 
took steps in this period to expand its ASEAN Swap Arrangements to include all ten member 
nations and introduced a related bilateral swap arrangement for the ASEAN+3 members 
(ASEAN, 2000b) – together, this would be later known as the Chiang Mai Initiative. 
 
Under the 5
th AFMM Chairmanship ASEAN expanded its surveillance mechanism to include 
participation by its ‘+3’ partners and intensifying the training of its officials in this regard 
through the Asian Development Bank (ASEAN, 2001). In this period, the 2nd round of 
negotiations on the liberalisation of the financial services sector was concluded and the Bilateral 
Swap Arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative were expanded (ASEAN, 2002). During the 
6
th AFMM Chairmanship the ASEAN Swap Arrangements were renewed and new Bilateral 




th AFMM Chairmanship, the “Roadmap for Integration of ASEAN in Finance” – 
ASEAN’s proposal to achieve financial integration – was concluded and adopted by the 
members. The Bilateral Swap Arrangements under the auspices of the Chiang Mai Initiative 
were expanded. ASEAN’s priority areas in integrating in finance became: institutional capacity 
                                                            
21 ASEAN+3 is a grouping of nations that include the 10 member States of ASEAN and those of the ‘+3 partners’: China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. 21 
 
building (both legal and regulatory), capital market collaboration (training and harmonisation of 
standards), capital account liberalisation and currency cooperation (as opposed to adopting a 
common currency) for the purposes of regional trade and economic integration (ASEAN, 2003). 
 
During the 8
th AFMM Chairmanship the ASEAN Swap Arrangements
22 were expanded from 
US$ 1 billion to US$ 2 billion and the Asian Bond Market Initiative succeeded in launching the 
first of it local currency denominated bonds. The 3
rd round of negotiations on the liberalisation of 
the financial services sector was concluded (ASEAN 2004a, 2005).  
 
The 9th AFMM Chairmanship ASEAN announced its intention to develop an interlinked 
ASEAN securities market by 2010 that would enable freer flow of capital, harmonise standards 
and practices and improve overall market liquidity (ASEAN, 2005). The period of the 10th 
AFMM Chairmanship had few significant developments with the launch of the FTSE/ASEAN 
Index intended to serve as a catalyst for further integration of ASEAN members’ stock markets 
(ASEAN, 2006a). While under the 11
th AFMM Chairmanship, ASEAN announced the 
establishment of a “bond portal” and information resources intended to provide a centralised 
platform of information on ASEAN’s bond markets (ASEAN, 2007). 
 
When comparing the Bai and Perron (1998a) model’s break dates in Table 5 with the AFMM 
regime break dates in Table 1, it is immediately revealed that there is not an exact match of 
regimes or regime changes in either model. This is peculiar to the case under investigation and, 
as discussed above, is largely due to the fact that ASEAN’s leadership changes occur on an 
annual basis. However, it is still possible to assess whether the political break points fall inside 
the confidence intervals produced by the application of the Bai and Perron (1998a) model i.e. a 
partial match. The influence of ASEAN politics on financial integration can then still be argued 
but becomes a matter open to interpretation. 
 
                                                            
22 The ASEAN swap arrangements or ASAs are short-term liquidity arrangements among the members of ASEAN. 22 
 
Further comparison of Tables 1 and 5 reveals that none of the 10 AFMM regime 
changes/switches occur on the break dates identified in either of the series analysed with the Bai 
and Perron (1998a) model. However, 7 to 8 of the 10 AFMM regime changes/switches fall 
within the 95 percent confidence intervals produced in either series indicating a partial match 
between the political breaks and the Bai and Perron (1998a) breaks. 
 
The 7 AFMM leadership (chairmanship) switches corresponding with the Bai and Perron 
(1998a) break dates for the FTSE/ASEAN series are: the switch from 1
st to 2
nd AFMM 




th AFMM Chairmanships (20 March 






th AFMM Chairmanships (6 August 




th AFMM Chairmanships (6 April 
2005 and 5 April 2006). 
 
Similarly, the 8 AFMM leadership (chairmanship) switches corresponding with the Bai and 
Perron (1998a) break dates for the Invesco series are: the switch from 1
st to 2
nd AFMM 




th AFMM Chairmanships (20 March 




th AFMM Chairmanships (25 March 2000, 07 
April 2001), 6
th to 7
th  and 7
th to 8





th AFMM Chairmanships (7 April, 2004, 6 April 2005) and the 9
th to 10
th AFMM 
Chairmanships (5 April 2006). 
 
Smyth and Narayan’s (2006) application of the Caporale and Grier methodology (when faced by 
a similar partial match and knowledge of more than one break) demonstrated that the coefficients 
(in our case the δ-coefficients) indicate which regime change/switch in leadership had the largest 
effect (by magnitude) on the underlying economic variable and argue that with the knowledge of 
such break points we are able to deduce the importance of leadership change leading to a break 
i.e. the magnitude of the delta coefficient following a break in the economic time series, indicates 
the effect of the corresponding regime change/switch in the political model. 
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On this basis, Table 5 outlines the δ-coefficients of the FTSE/ASEAN and Invesco series. For the 
FTSE/ASEAN series, the effects of the regime changes/switches in leadership correspond to (by 
magnitude in descending order): δ7 associated with break 6 is the largest in magnitude followed 
δ6 associated with break 5; δ3 associated with break 2; δ5 associated with break 4; δ4 associated 
with break 3 and δ2 associated with break 1. 
 
For the Invesco Series, the story is similar as the effects of the regime changes/switches in 
leadership correspond to (by magnitude in descending order): δ7 associated with break 6 is the 
largest in magnitude followed δ6 associated with break 5; δ3 associated with break 2; δ5 
associated with break 4; δ2 associated with break 1and δ4 associated with break 3.  
 
Based on the magnitude of the δ-coefficients alone, it is apparent that the influence of the 
ASEAN finance ministers over the integration of ASEAN members’ financial markets has been 
greater in recent years. This is indicated by the increase in the magnitude of the δ-coefficient 
following each break. However, the magnitude of the δ-coefficients do not significantly vary 
from one break to the next, which indicates that the influence of a switch in regime is marginal. 
Together this implies that, although the influence of ASEAN finance ministers has increased in 
recent years, the effect of a regime change/switch of leadership of ASEAN finance ministers has 
had negligible implications for financial integration between the member nations’ financial 
markets. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse whether the politics of ASEAN (as represented by the 
ASEAN Finance Ministers) is influencing the development of supra-national financial 
integration within South-East Asia’s financial markets (as represented by the FTSE/ASEAN and 
Invesco series). To this end, the Bai and Perron (1998a) model was employed together with a 
methodology developed, on the same basis, by Caporale and Grier (2005a) while relying upon 
the theoretical basis provided by the Law-of-One-Price and the generally accepted assumption 
that politics do matter when assessing financial integration.  24 
 
 
The findings indicated that none of the 10 AFMM regime changes/switches provided a perfect 
match with the break dates identified in either of the series analysed. However, 7 to 8 of the 10 
AFMM regime changes/switches fell within the 95 percent confidence intervals and thus 
indicated a partial match between the political and economic breaks.  
 
When compared with the δ-coefficients of the economic series considered in the paper it was 
found that the effects of the regime changes/switches in leadership corresponded in both series 
and that although the influence of ASEAN finance ministers has increased in recent years, the 
effect of regime changes/switches of leadership of ASEAN finance ministers has had a 
negligible implication for the integration of the member nations’ financial markets. 
 
This provides evidence that the politics of ASEAN has had little bearing on the development of 
supra-national financial integration among South-East Asia’s financial markets and that much of 
the ‘significant strides’ made toward financial integration as championed by ASEAN, thus far, 
appears to be political-rhetoric. This paper’s analysis, however, was limited to the regime 
represented by the ASEAN Finance Ministers meetings. Other political groups within ASEAN, 
although of less importance in terms of financial integration, may prove to have different effects 
on integration of South-East Asia’s financial markets: a subject for future research.  25 
 
References 
ASEAN = ASEAN Secretariat 
 
ASEAN Secretariat (1997a), “Joint Press Communiqué of the First ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting”, Phuket, Thailand, 1 March, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/2457.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (1997b), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the Special ASEAN Finance 
Ministers Meeting”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1 December, viewed 06 November 2008,  
<http://www.aseansec.org/2460.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (1998), “Joint Press Statement of the 2nd ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting”, Jakarta, Indonesia, 28 February, viewed 06 November 2008,  
<http://www.aseansec.org/2267.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (1999a), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 3rd ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting”, Ha Noi, Viet Nam, 20 March, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/2271.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (1999b), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the Special ASEAN Finance 
Ministers Meeting”, Manila, Philippines, 25 November, viewed 06 November 2008,  
<http://www.aseansec.org/5429.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2000a), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 4th ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting”, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam 25-26 March, viewed 06 November 
2008,  <http://www.aseansec.org/634.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2000b), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the Special ASEAN Finance 
Ministers Meeting”, Prague, Czech Republic, 25 September, viewed 06 November 2008,  
<http://www.aseansec.org/636.htm> 26 
 
ASEAN Secretariat (2001), “Joint Ministerial Statement Fifth ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia7-8 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/1121.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2002), “Joint Ministerial Statement Sixth ASEAN Finance Ministers 
Meeting, Yangon”, Myanmar, 5-6 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/7925.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2003), “Joint Ministerial Statement Seventh ASEAN Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting”, Makati, Philippines, 6-7 August, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/15029.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2004a), “Joint Ministerial Statement 8th ASEAN Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting”, Singapore, 7 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/16062.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2004b), “Organisational Structure of ASEAN”, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/13103.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2005), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 9th ASEAN Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting”, Vientiane, 6 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/17405.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2006a), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 10th ASEAN Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting”, Siem Reap, 5 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/18353.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2006b), “ASEAN Investment Area: An Update”, viewed 06 November 
2008, <http://www.aseansec.org/11461.htm> 
ASEAN Secretariat (2007), “Joint Ministerial Statement of the 11th ASEAN Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting Chiang Mai”, Thailand, 5 April, viewed 06 November 2008, 
<http://www.aseansec.org/20472.htm> 27 
 
Bai, J & Perron, P, (1998a) "Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural 
Changes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66, no.1 (Jan.), pp. 47-78 
Bai, J & Perron, P (1998b) "Computation and Analysis of Multiple-Structural-Change Models," 
Working Paper presented to Econometric Society, (Sep.) 
Bai, J & Perron, P, (2003) "Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models," 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-22 
Bekaert, G & Harvey, G (1997), “Emerging equity market volatility”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 43, no. 1, (Jan.), pp. 29-77 
Berg, J, Grande, M & Mongelli, F (2005) Elements of the Euro Area: Integrating Financial 
Markets, Ashgate, Great Britain  
Caporale, T & Grier, K (2000) “Political Regime Change and the Real Interest Rate”, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 32, no. 3 (Aug.), pp. 320-334 
Caporale, T & Grier, K (2005a) “How Smart Is my Dummy? Time Series Tests for the Influence 
of Politics”, Political Analysis, vol. 13, pp. 77-94 
Caporale, T & Grier, K (2005b) “Inflation, Presidents, Fed Chairs, and Regime Shifts in the U.S. 
Real Interest Rate”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 37, no. 6 (Dec.), pp. 
1153-1163  
Caporaso, J & Pelowski, A (1971) "Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-Series 
Quasi-Experimental Analysis" The American Political Science Review, vol. 65, no. 2 
(Jun.), pp. 418-433 
Carrion-i-Silvestre, J Ll., del Barrio, T and López-Bazo, E (2005): "Breaking the Panels: An 
Application to GDP per capita", Econometrics Journal, vol. 8, pp. 159-175 
Ferrando, A & Vesala, J (2005) “Concepts and Measures of Financial Integration” in Berg, J, 
Grande, M & Mongelli, F (eds) Elements of the Euro Area: Integrating Financial 
Markets, Ashgate, Great Britain  28 
 
FTSE (2006) “FTSE/ASEAN Index Series: Tradable and Benchmark Indices for South East 
Asia”, Research Report 2nd Edition, 27 July  
Haas, E (1968) The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, USA  
Hadri, K (2000) “Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data” Econometrics Journal vol. 
3, pp. 148–61 
Invesco (2008) “Invesco Funds Series 1: Invesco ASEAN Equity Fund”, Simplified Prospectus, 
18 April 
Lee, J & Strazicich, M (2004) “Minimum LM Unit Root Test with One Structural Break”, 
Department of Economics, Appalachian State University 
Libanio, G (2005) “Unit roots in macroeconomic time series: theory, implications, and evidence” 
nova Economia Belo Horizonte vol. 15, no. 3 (Sep.-Dec.), pp. 145-176  
Lumsdaine, R & Papell, D (1997) “Multiple Trend Breaks and the Unit-Root Hypothesis” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 79, no. 2 (May), pp. 212-218  
Mongelli, F (2005) “What is European Economic and Monetary Union Telling us About the 
Properties of Optimum Currency Areas?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 43, 
no. 3, pp. 607–35 
Mundell, R (1961) “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, The American Economic Review, 
vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 657-665 
Perron, P (1989) “The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis” 
Econometrica, vol. 57, no. 6 (Nov.), pp. 1361-1401  
Rana, P (2002), ‘Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia: The Chiang Mai Initiative 
and Beyond’, ERD Working Paper Series, Asian Development Bank, no. 6 (Feb.) 29 
 
Rapach, D & Wohar, M (2005) “Regime Changes in International Real Interest Rates: Are They 
a Monetary Phenomenon?”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 37, issue 5, pp. 
887-906 
Smyth, R & Narayan, P (2004) “Hail to the Chief! Leadership and Structural Change in the 
Level of Consensus on the High Court of Australia”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 399–427 
Smyth, R & Narayan, P (2006) “Multiple Regime Shifts in Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
on the U.S. Supreme Court”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, vol.3, no.1, pp. 79–98 
Tan G (2003), ASEAN: Economic Development and Cooperation, 3rd Edition, Eastern 
Universities Press, Singapore 
Thambipillai, P & Saravanmuttu, J (1985) ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 
Timmermann, A (2001) “Structural Breaks, Incomplete Information, and Stock Prices”, Journal 
of Business & Economic Statistics, vol. 19, no. 3 (Jul.), pp. 299-314  
Zivot, E & Andrews, D (1992) “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and 
the Unit-Root Hypothesis”  Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, vol. 10, no. 3 
(Jul), pp. 251-270  30 
 
Figure 1: The Organisational Structure of ASEAN
Note: AEM:  ASEAN Economic Ministers; AMM:  ASEAN Ministerial Meeting; AFMM:  ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting; SEOM:  
Senior Economic Officials Meeting; ASC:  ASEAN Standing Committee; SOM:  Senior Officials Meeting; ASFOM:  ASEAN Senior 
Finance Officials Meeting.

























































1st AFMM-Special AFMM Chairmanship Thailand 01-Mar-1997 - 27-Feb-1998
2nd AFMM Chairmanship Indonesia 28-Feb-1998 - 19-Mar-1999
3rd AFMM-Special AFMM Chairmanship Vietnam/Philippines 20-Mar-1999 - 24-Mar-2000
4th AFMM-Special AFMM Chairmanship Brunei Darussalam 25-Mar-2000 - 06-Apr-2001
5th AFMM Chairmanship Malaysia 07-Apr-2001 - 04-Apr-2002
6th AFMM Chairmanship Myanmar 05-Apr-2002 - 05-Aug-2003
7th AFMM Chairmanship Philippines 06-Aug-2003 - 06-Apr-2004
8th AFMM Chairmanship Singapore 07-Apr-2004 - 05-Apr-2005
9th AFMM Chairmanship Lao PDR 06-Apr-2005 - 04-Apr-2006
10th AFMM Chairmanship Cambodia 05-Apr-2006 - 04-Apr-2007
11th AFMM Chairmanship Thailand 05-Apr-2007 - 03-Apr-2008
Table 1: ASEAN Finance Ministers Meetings: 1997 - 2008








S D(S) S D(S) S D(S)
Series Sample  Period Sample  Size t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
FTSE/ASEAN 1994 - 2007 730 -0.784973 -13.10174** -1.039448 -25.60919** 0.615146** 0.049033
[3] [2] [13] [13] [22] [13]
INVESCO 1994 -2007 730 -0.873973 -24.13135** -1.275139 -24.57361** 0.619051** 0.039806
[1] [0] [12] [12] [22] [12]
Note: ALL - unit-root tests were undertaken on EVIEWS 6.0 and are inclusive of trend and intercept; S denotes the level of the series and 
D(S) denotes the first difference of the series; * indicates statistical significance at 5% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
level;  ADF – null hypothesis of series has a unit root and alternate hypothesis of series is stationary; lag length is automatically selected 
via Schwartz Information Criterion with a maximum lag length of 19; critical values at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are -3.970, -3.416, -3.130 
respectively; PP – null hypothesis of series has a unit root and alternate hypothesis of series is stationary; bandwidth determined by Newey-
West using the Bartlett kernel; critical values at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are -3.970, -3.416, -3.130 respectively; KPSS – null hypothesis of 
series is stationary and alternate hypothesis of series has a unit root; bandwidth determined by Newey-West using the Bartlett kernel; 






















FTSE/ASEAN 1994 - 2007 730 -0.76553728 0.606000 0.383000 0.286000
INVESCO 1994 -2007 730 -0.88415286 0.616000 0.378000 0.284000
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8
FTSE/ASEAN 24-May-1995 15-Oct-1997 14-Apr-1999 13-Sep-2000 20-Mar-2002 13-Aug-2003 05-Jan-2005 02-Aug-2006
INVESCO 11-Jan-1995 09-Oct-1996 15-Apr-1998 15-Sep-1999 07-Feb-2001 07-Aug-2002 31-Dec-2003 03-Aug-2005
Series
Estimated Break Points
Note: Null hypothesis of series is breakpoint stationary and alternate hypothesis of series has a unit root; The number of breakpoints have been estimated using the 
modified Schwartz Information Criteria (LWZ) i.e. model 2; the maximum number of breaks = 8; trimming specified at 10 % or [0.10T, 0.90T]; sample critical 
values are computed by means of Monte Carlo simulations using 20,000 replications. 
Table 3: Carrion-i-Silvestre et al (2005) KPSS Univariate Test Results for Benchmark Index and Equity Fund






Zt(1) q = 1 p =0 h = 73 Mmax = 8
FTSE/ASEAN INVESCO
Statistics Statistics 1% 5% 10%
SupFt(1) 0.1757 0.4055 13.00 9.10 7.42
SupFt(2) 11.4120*** 8.4735** 10.14 7.92 6.93
SupFt(3) 12.7757*** 14.9515*** 8.42 6.84 6.09
SupFt(4) 8.5230*** 29.2504*** 7.31 6.03 5.44
SupFt(5) 9.1498*** 19.7659*** 6.48 5.37 4.85
SupFt(6) 10.5660*** 19.3267*** 5.74 4.80 4.32
SupFt(7) 63.1516*** 42.6657*** 5.05 4.23 3.83
SupFt(8) 61.3630*** 41.9123*** 4.28 3.58 3.22
UDmax 63.1516*** 42.6657*** 13.07 9.52 8.05
Wdmax at 1% level 186.383*** 127.3037*** 14.53 n.a. n.a.
Wdmax at 5% level 155.9786** 106.5369** n.a. 10.39 n.a.
Wdmax at 10% level 141.4018* 96.5805* n.a. n.a. 8.63
Note: h = minimal length of segment; Mmax = maximum number of breaks permitted; p = number of regressors whose 
coefficients are fixed across regimes; and q = number of regressors whose coefficients are allowed to change. The 
SupFt(L) F-Statistic considers a null hypothesis of no structural breaks (m = 0) against the alternative hypothesis that 
there are m = k breaks. The UDmax statistic is the maximum value of the SupFt(L) F-Statistic where L represents the 
upper bound.. The WDmax statistic weights the individual statistics so as to equalise the p-values of m. The relevant 











δ1 6.101911 (662.552293) m1 198 T1 15-Oct-1997 17-Sep-1997 - 05-May-1999
δ2 5.006712 (341.209864) m2 276 T2 14-Apr-1999 10-Mar-1999 - 21-Mar-2001
δ3 5.409998 (361.534214) m3 351 T3 20-Sep-2000 21-Apr-1999 - 29-Nov-2000
δ4 5.082177 (481.903353) m4 502 T4 13-Aug-2003 08-Jan-2003 - 15-Jun-2003
δ5 5.366480 (353.812045) m5 575 T5 05-Jan-2005 05-Feb-2003 - 01-Mar-2006
δ6 5.578612 (389.811607) m6 657 T6 02-Aug-2006 02-Feb-2005 - 10-Jan-2007
δ7 5.977919 (394.124239) m7 n.a. T7 n.a. n.a. - n.a.
δ8 n.a. n.a. m8 n.a. T8 n.a. n.a. - n.a.
δ9 n.a. n.a.
δ1 4.388445 (521.722734) m1 198 T1 15-Oct-1997 06-Aug-1997 - 23-Sep-1998
δ2 3.584660 (267.480301) m2 276 T2 14-Apr-1999 06-Nov-1996 - 14-Jun-2000
δ3 3.917006 (284.686291) m3 350 T3 13-Sep-2000 01-Mar-2000 - 16-Jan-2002
δ4 3.468126 (354.052580) m4 496 T4 02-Jul-2003 23-Apr-2003 - 23-Jun-2004
δ5 3.828028 (281.954053) m5 572 T5 15-Dec-2004 01-Oct-2003 - 08-Mar-2006
δ6 3.984594 (310.377380) m6 657 T6 02-Aug-2006 26-Oct-2005 - 20-Sep-2006
δ7 4.396108 (317.341070) m7 n.a. T7 n.a. n.a. - n.a.
δ8 n.a. n.a. m8 n.a. T8 n.a. n.a. - n.a.
δ9 n.a. n.a.




Number of breaks selected by the LWZ method: 6








95% Confidence Interval for Break 
Dates
Number of breaks selected by the LWZ method: 6
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